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1. Introduction 
Increasingly rapid technological developments in robotics, human-computer interaction 
(HCI), and the computer and video games industry have led to the development of quite 
sophisticated, intelligent robots and realistic, computer-generated characters. These robots 
and characters vary in their human-like qualities, from visual and behavioural replicas of 
humans, to androids, aliens or other beings that have some human characteristics, to 
creatures that have little in common with humans. The most common human-like qualities 
evidenced by these robots and characters are intelligence, looks, movements and language. 
Yet until very recently they were often not endowed with much in the way of emotions, and 
when they were they typically appeared emotionally underdeveloped, stilted, or false. For 
example, in James Cameron’s film Terminator 2, Arnold Schwarzenegger plays an 
emotionless but intelligent humanoid robot. The film character explains that it is equipped 
with a microchip based on connectionist neural-net architecture. He comes to understand 
the patterning of human emotional behaviour but, of course, he does not have feelings or 
emotions. This was also true of other animated or computer-generated characters in films. 
Even if the characters gave rise to highly emotional video game or film scenes, the users or 
audience were in agreement that the characters were emotionally impoverished or did not 
have emotions at all. In large part this was and still is a technological issue: advances made 
in endowing machines and computer-generated characters with realistic emotions have not 
kept pace with the rapid advances in endowing such machines and characters with realistic 
intelligence, looks, movements and language. Nonetheless, given that these robots and 
characters are designed to interact with humans, and that emotions are so central to 
successful social interactions, effective implementation of emotions in these robots and 
characters is vital. 
The latest developments in HCI include an area that is concerned with implementing 
emotions with mostly human-like characteristics into HCI technology. About 10 years ago, 
even a completely new field of computer science emerged that is based on such an attempt, 
namely “affective computing” (Picard, 1997). Since then, various attempts have been made 
either to implement emotions into machines or have machines that express emotional 
reactions. A close examination of these examples reveals two ways of implementing 
emotions and emotional reactions in HCI technology. First, emotions are seen as 
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constituting a state variable affecting the range or diversity of responses available to the 
machine or interface (Suzuki et al., 1998; Arkin et al., 2003) without changing the responses 
themselves. Second, emotions are linked to overt responses shaping directly the response 
characteristics of the machine or interface (e.g., Breazeal, 2003; Fujita, 2001), i.e. changing the 
response characteristics noticeably. This variation in how to implement emotions in 
machines seems to mirror the ambiguities in the understanding of human emotions. 
Before the scientific study of emotions had disappeared almost completely in the wake of 
behaviourism, emotions were often introduced as the undesired side effect of behaviour.  “I 
was so enraged” one says, “that I couldn’t think straight”. Emotions and cognitions were 
considered strange bedfellows and strictly separated for decades (for reviews and 
discussion, see e.g., Prinz, 2004; Oatley, 2004; Mandler, 2007). This concept of emotion as 
distinct from and irrelevant to cognition, in other words rather a disturbing factor in 
information processing, seems no longer tenable. Emotions play an important part in 
cognition and in the adaptive significance of ongoing behavioural decisions (e.g., Schachter 
& Singer, 1962; Damasio, 1994). We argue that the psychology of emotions, especially that 
which characterizes the relation between specific emotional states and the related facial, 
bodily, and vocal patterns, may provide a useful theoretical framework for model-driven 
applications in affective computing. 
For this purpose a functional approach to emotion research seems to be the most promising 
(e.g., Frijda, 1986; Izard, 1991; Lazarus, 1991; Plutchik, 1980; Scherer, 1984). Schneider and 
Dittrich (1989) proposed a functional system-analytic approach to studying emotions. 
Following this approach, emotion can be described as a phylogenetically evolved 
mechanism for behavioural adaptation. Adaptation can take place both with respect to 
preparation for appropriate responses to environmental challenges and to providing 
chances for evaluation and communication of intentions in order to optimize response 
characteristics (see Schneider & Dittrich, 1989). In line with this approach, we shall highlight 
two essential functions of emotions with respect to computing and summarize research on 
the perception of emotional expressions.  The two functional processes that are essential for 
emotional processing consist of (a) the intra-individual regulation of cognition and actions 
and (b) the inter-individual regulation in communication. 
In human psychology, emotion research has concentrated on the study of, on the one hand, 
basic and unique human emotions as shown in facial, vocal and body expressions and their 
role in communication, and on the other hand, on affective states and internal bodily 
reactions and their role in cognition or behavioural organization. With respect to the latter 
research programme, Arbib and Fellous (2004) point out that the neural and chemical basis 
of animal function differs greatly from the mechanics and electronics of current machines, 
such that implementing emotions in such machines will require functional theories of 
emotion that abstract away from the details of the biological substrates. Our concern in this 
chapter is primarily with the former research programme and its implications for affective 
computing. Nonetheless, it is important to note that in animals these two aspects of 
emotions (expression/communication and behavioural organization) co-evolved and 
remain intimately linked, and as we shall point out below, implementing one might be 
aided by implementing the other. 
The recognition of emotions in communicative social situations relies strongly on visual 
cues. Following Darwin, Paul Ekman and colleagues (e.g., Ekman et al., 1972; Ekman, 1992) 
proposed that there are only a limited number of basic and unique facial expressions. They 
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characterized six emotional facial expressions on the basis of a unique subset of facial 
muscle movements: disgust, surprise, fear, joy, anger, and sadness. These emotions were 
found in infants and blind people, who had no opportunity to imitate them. Also, the 
appearance, range and interpretation of these emotions are supposed to be similar in Papua 
New Guinea or Hatfield, England. These facial expressions of basic emotions have been 
systematically characterized in terms of individual facial muscle movements using the 
Facial Action Coding System, or FACS (Ekman & Friesen, 1978). 
As exemplified by the above work, the study of emotion perception has relied primarily on 
visually presented static facial expressions. While faces are a vitally important – arguably 
the most important – source of cues in non-verbal communication in humans, they are not 
the only source of such cues. In the visual modality, postures and movement of the body 
and its parts also make a substantial contribution to non-verbal communication, including 
the communication of emotions; yet relatively little work has been devoted to the study of 
the perception of emotional body expressions. A central aim of this chapter is to review the 
current state of knowledge about what cues the human visual system uses in the perception 
of body postures and movements, with particular focus on emotion perception, and about 
the functional organization of the underlying neural systems. 
An important reason why robots and animated characters can appear emotionally 
impoverished is that they rarely express emotions in realistic ways. The attribution of 
emotions by an observer or interactant depends a lot on the character’s emotional 
expressions – not just what she does but how she expresses her (real, simulated, or 
intended) inner feelings. Only if someone shows emotional reactions are we likely to 
attribute emotional states to this person. Indeed, humans even tend to interpret very simple 
cues as indications of emotional reactions. For example, in animated scenarios a simple 
change of colour might give rise to emotional interpretations in the viewer or user (e.g. 
Miwa et al., 2001). Furthermore, when viewing a moving abstract stimulus, people tend to 
attribute social meaning and purpose to the movement (e.g., Heider & Simmel, 1944; 
Dittrich & Lea, 1994) (reviews: Dittrich, 1999; Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000). 
Research on visual recognition has been dominated by studies about the recognition of 
objects. In these studies, the roles of form and motion cues have been investigated and 
various models of object recognition rely on the dissociation of the processing of form and 
motion cues. In sections 2 and 3 we will outline major lines of research in human 
psychology and neuropsychology that have applied this approach to the study of form and 
motion cues in the perception of social objects, and specifically bodies, and in the perception 
of emotional expressions from postures and movements of the body. Then in section 4 we 
shall place this work in the wider context of affective computing. 
2. The perception of bodily form and motion 
2.1 The visual cues that humans use to perceive bodies and their motion 
The form of the human body could be represented in several different ways, demarcating 
points on a configural-processing continuum, from part-based to holistic processing. Thus 
bodies could be represented in terms of individual body parts or features, the relative 
positions of those parts (i.e., first-order spatial relations), the structural hierarchy of body 
parts (i.e., first-order configuration plus information about the relative position of features 
with respect to the whole body), or in terms of whole body posture templates (Reed et al., 
2006). Unlike faces, the relative positions of body parts change as people move, which 
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suggests the need for a relatively fine-grained structural description of the spatial 
relationships among body parts. 
A series of experiments by Reed and colleagues (2006) suggests that the recognition of body 
postures depends on the processing of the structural hierarchy of body parts. This study 
drew on the well-known inversion effect in face recognition, that turning faces upside down 
impairs the ability to recognize their identity more than inverting nonface objects impairs 
the recognition of their identity. It is generally considered that face inversion disrupts 
configural processing, specifically the coding of second-order relational information, that is, 
the metric distances amongst features (e.g., Diamond & Carey, 1986; Rhodes et al., 1993; 
Maurer et al., 2002). In Reed et al.’s (2006) study, participants had to judge whether two 
sequentially presented images were the same or different. Each pair of images was 
presented either upright or inverted. Performance was significantly impaired for inverted 
compared to upright whole-body postures but not houses, replicating their earlier finding 
(Reed et al., 2003). The matching of isolated body parts (arms, legs, heads) was unaffected 
by inversion, indicating that, as with isolated facial features, individual body parts do not 
evoke configural processing. Disrupting first-order spatial relations, by rearranging the 
body parts around the trunk (by e.g., putting the arms in the leg and head positions), 
abolished the inversion effect, indicating that such first-order configural cues do not 
contribute to body posture recognition. Presenting half-body postures that were divided 
along the vertical midline (i.e., left or right halves), which preserves the structural hierarchy 
of body parts but disrupts holistic template matching, did not abolish the body inversion 
effect. In contrast, presenting half-body postures that were divided along the horizontal 
midline (the waist), which preserves salient parts (e.g., both arms) but disrupts structural 
hierarchy information, did not produce an inversion effect. Thus the particular form of 
configural processing critical to body posture recognition, as indexed by the presence of an 
inversion effect, appears to be the structural hierarchy of body parts, that is, the positions of 
body parts relative to themselves and to the whole body. 
There are three main classes of information pertaining to the movements of human bodies: 
the changes of structural or form information over time (including motion-mediated 
structural information), kinematics (e.g., velocity, acceleration, displacement) and dynamics 
(motion specified in terms of mass and force). Considerable attention has been given to the 
role of kinematics in specifying cues for action and person perception (e.g., Westhoff & 
Troje, 2007). Typically, these studies employ point-light or patch-light displays of human or 
other biological motion, in which static form information is minimal or absent but motion 
information (kinematics and dynamics) and motion-mediated structural information are 
preserved (Johansson, 1973). Point-light displays of body movements provide a sufficient 
basis for observers to discriminate biological motion from other types of motion, and to 
make accurate judgements about the people making the movements, including sex from gait 
(e.g., Barclay et al., 1978), identity from gait (Richardson & Johnston, 2005) or actions (Loula 
et al., 2005), the weight of boxes from the lifting movement (Runeson & Frykholm, 1981), 
and complex individual or social actions from whole-body movements (Dittrich, 1993). 
Some of this evidence shows equivalent or near equivalent performance with point-light 
compared to full-light (or solid-body) displays, in which the whole body is visible (e.g., 
Runeson & Frykholm, 1981), which suggests that static form cues are rather less important 
than motion cues and may often be unnecessary for successful judgements about people and 
their actions based on their visible behaviour. Evidence for the relative importance of 
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kinematic cues comes from studies that measure the effects on recognition of changes in 
certain kinematic or structural dimensions of point-light stimuli. For example, accuracy in 
judging the sex of point-light walkers was influenced more by “body sway” than by the 
ratio of shoulder to hip width, in Mather and Murdoch’s (1994) study, and was greater 
when point-light walkers were normalized with respect to their size (thus providing only 
motion information) than when they were normalized with respect to their motion 
information (thus providing only size cues), in Troje’s (2002) study. 
It has been argued that the ability to discriminate at least simple biological movements in 
point-light displays may be based on relatively low-level or mid-level visual processing that 
does not involve the reconstruction of the form of body parts or of the whole body, either 
from static form or motion-mediated structural cues (e.g., Casile & Giese, 2005; Mather et al., 
1992). Nevertheless, neuropsychological and neurophysiological evidence demonstrates that 
form information can indeed subserve biological motion perception from point-light 
displays (e.g., Hirai & Hiraki, 2006; McLeod et al., 1996; Peelen et al., 2006; Vaina et al., 
2002). The processing of changes in the form of the body over time may be particularly 
important (e.g., Beintema & Lappe, 2002), especially in the context of more sophisticated 
tasks, such as recognizing emotional states or complex actions (Casile & Giese, 2005; Giese & 
Poggio, 2003). This conclusion gains some support from inversion effects in biological 
motion perception. The spontaneous identification of point-light motion displays as 
biological motion is impaired when they are shown upside down (Bertenthal & Pinto, 1994; 
Pavlova & Sokolov, 2000; Shipley, 2003; Troje, 2003), even given prior knowledge about 
display orientation (Pavlova & Sokolov, 2003). Moreover, neural activation characteristic of 
upright biological motion displays is attenuated or absent when such displays are inverted 
(Grossman & Blake, 2001; Pavlova et al., 2004). Inversion of point-light displays also 
disrupts the ability to distinguish the identity of the actors from their actions (Loula et al., 
2005), and sex judgements based on gait tend to be reversed (Barclay et al., 1978). While it is 
likely that inversion of biological motion disrupts the processing of dynamic cues related to 
movement within the earth’s gravitational field (Barclay et al., 1978; Bertenthal et al., 1987; 
Pavlova & Sokolov, 2000; Shipley, 2003), there is also some evidence to suggest that 
inversion of whole-body movements impairs the processing of configural information (Lu et 
al., 2005; Pinto & Shiffrar, 1999). 
2.2 The human brain contains regions specialized for processing bodily form and 
motion 
The form of the human (or primate) body is a category of visual object for which there 
appears to be both selectivity and functional specialization in higher-level visual cortices. By 
selectivity we mean the extent to which a mechanism is activated by or operates over a 
particular stimulus class, such as faces or bodies, as compared to other stimulus classes. By 
functional specialization (or function for short) we mean a mechanism’s specificity for 
performing a particular process. Evidence for body-selective visual mechanisms comes from 
studies of both humans and non-human primates (reviewed by Peelen & Downing, 2007). In 
humans, the evidence points to two distinct regions, dubbed the extrastriate body area 
(EBA), located in lateral occipitotemporal cortex (Downing et al., 2001), and the fusiform 
body area (FBA), located in fusiform gyrus (Peelen & Downing, 2005; Schwarzlose et al., 
2005). The EBA and FBA respond selectively to human bodies and body parts compared 
with objects, faces, and other control stimuli, despite considerable anatomical overlap 
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between the FBA and the face-selective fusiform face area (FFA) (Peelen & Downing, 2005; 
Schwarzlose et al., 2005; Peelen et al., 2006) and between the EBA, motion processing area 
V5/MT, and object-form-selective lateral occipital complex (Peelen et al., 2006; Downing et 
al., 2007). 
With respect to functional specialization, the EBA represents the static structure of viewed 
bodies (Downing et al., 2006; Peelen et al., 2006; Michels et al., 2005), although these 
representations appear to be at the level of individual body parts rather than at the level of 
whole-body configuration (Taylor et al., 2007; Urgesi et al., 2007a). As discussed above, 
configural cues in body perception include the relative positions of body parts and the 
positions of those parts with respect to the whole body (Reed et al., 2006), and there is 
evidence indicating that the processing of one or other or both of these configural cues is 
more a function of the FBA than of the EBA (Taylor et al., 2007). 
Another region implicated as having a critical role in processing configural body cues is left 
ventral premotor cortex (Urgesi et al., 2007a). This region of inferior frontal cortex is known 
for its role in both the planning of motor actions (Johnson & Grafton, 2003) and in the visual 
discrimination of such actions (Grafton et al., 1996; Pobric & Hamilton, 2006; Urgesi et al., 
2007b), which has led to the suggestion that it forms part of a system for simulating the 
observed action to allow it to be understood (Gallese et al., 2004; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 
2004). 
The EBA appears to constitute a critical early stage in the perception of other people (Chan 
et al., 2004), rather than a later processing stage via, for example, top-down effects related to 
imaginary gestures and movement (de Gelder, 2006). Evidence in support of this claim 
comes from recent studies using either intracranial recordings or transcranial magnetic 
stimulation (TMS). Pourtois et al. (2007) recorded highly body-selective visual evoked 
potentials over the EBA of a patient that started approximately 190ms and peaked 260ms 
after stimulus onset. Consistent with this finding are reports of selectively impaired 
perception of body form following application of TMS over EBA at 150–250 ms (Urgesi et 
al., 2004; Urgesi et al., 2007a) and at 150-350ms (Urgesi et al., 2007b) post-stimulus onset. 
Despite this evidence, however, it is entirely possible that, in addition to its role in the early 
visual processing of body form, the EBA also plays a role in later processing stages of person 
perception. Little is yet known about the timing of the FBA and ventral premotor cortex 
involvement in body and person perception, although given that they preferentially 
represent configural over body-part cues it is likely that their initial involvement occurs 
subsequent to that of the EBA. Nonetheless, as Taylor et al. (2007) comment, a strictly serial 
model is probably too simplistic, given the widespread bi-directional connectivity in visual 
cortex. 
Our brains contain systems specialized for processing the movements of bodies and their 
parts (including faces), in addition to those systems specialized for processing bodily facial 
form. (Although as we shall soon see, the computations performed by these biological 
motion-processing systems may well draw on form information.) Important early evidence 
came from neuropsychological lesion studies, which demonstrated spared ability to 
discriminate biological motion stimuli despite severe impairments in discriminating other 
types of motion (Vaina et al., 1990; McLeod et al., 1996). However, not all aspects of 
biological motion perception are normal in such ‘motion blind’ patients. For example, 
McLeod et al. (1996) report a case of a subject who was able to describe accurately a variety 
of actions from whole-body movements represented in point-light displays, but was unable 
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to report in which direction the figure was facing, or whether it was approaching or 
retreating from her. Furthermore, this same patient was severely impaired at identifying 
natural speech from point-light or fully illuminated facial movements, despite being 
unimpaired in recognizing speech-patterns from face photographs (Campbell et al., 1997). 
In patients with relatively spared biological motion perception despite deficits in perceiving 
other sorts of motion, the lesions are restricted to ventral and middle occipito-temporal 
cortices, sparing superior temporal and parietal areas. Electrophyshiological and 
neuroimaging studies confirm a particularly important role for superior temporal cortex in 
the perception of body and facial movement (Puce & Perrett, 2003; Allison et al., 2000). 
Single-cell recording studies in monkeys revealed neurons in superior temporal sulcus (STS) 
and superior temporal gyrus (STG), especially in the anterior portion of superior temporal 
polysensory area (STPa), selective for various types of face, limb and whole body motion 
(e.g., Jellema et al., 2000; Oram & Perrett, 1994; Perrett et al., 1985). Functional imaging 
studies in humans show that whole-body movements as represented in point-light displays 
elicit activation in pSTS compared to a variety of non-biological movements (e.g., Bonda et 
al., 1996; Grossman et al., 2000; Grossman & Blake, 2002; Pelphrey et al., 2003; Peuskens et 
al., 2005; Vaina et al., 2001). Regions of posterior and middle STS and surrounding superior 
and middle temporal gyri are also selectively activated by movements of the face or other 
body parts, as represented in fully-illuminated displays, compared to static images of the 
same body parts (Wheaton et al., 2004) and to non-biological motion (Puce et al., 1998). 
Disruption of the activity of right pSTS using TMS has confirmed a critical role for this 
region in perceiving body movement (Grossman et al., 2005). More recently, a lesion-overlap 
study with 60 brain-damaged subjects showed that impairments in the ability to 
discriminate whole-body from non-biological motion in point-light displays were most 
reliably associated with lesions in posterior temporal and ventral premotor cortices, which 
corresponded with the regions whose activity in neurologically intact subjects was selective 
for the same point-light whole-body movements (Saygin, 2007). The critical involvement of 
ventral premotor cortex in this study confirms earlier studies showing selectivity in this 
region for point-light whole-body movements (Saygin et al., 2004; Pelphrey et al., 2003). 
There are also reports of selectivity to biological motion, in the form of whole-body 
movements, in the posterior inferior temporal sulcus/middle temporal gyrus (Grossman & 
Blake, 2002; Michels et al., 2005; Peuskens et al., 2005; Saygin et al., 2004), which might 
reflect activation of body-selective neurons in the EBA or motion-selective neurons in the 
overlapping V5/MT. There is even a report of selectivity to whole-body movements in the 
face-selective FFA (Grossman & Blake, 2002), which might reflect activation of body-
selective or face-selective neurons, or of both body- and face-selective neurons. These last 
two issues have been resolved by a recent study: biological (whole-body) motion selectivity 
in occipitotemporal cortex was correlated on a voxel-by-voxel basis to body selectivity (i.e., 
EBA and FBA activation) but not to face selectivity (i.e., FFA activation) or to non-biological 
motion selectivity (i.e., V5/MT activation) (Peelen et al., 2006). 
Neuroimaging studies in humans have also revealed distinct regions of STS selective for the 
movements of different body parts. While face, hand, mouth, and leg movements activate 
substantially overlapping regions of right pSTS (Thompson et al., 2007; Wheaton et al., 2004; 
Pelphrey et al., 2005), movements of the face (Thompson et al., 2007; Wheaton et al., 2004) 
and mouth (Pelphrey et al., 2005) are also associated with activity along the mid-posterior 
STS, as are leg movements (Wheaton et al., 2004). Moreover, whereas both facial speech 
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(principally mouth) and visually similar but linguistically meaningless facial movements 
activate right pSTS, speech and non-speech facial movements also elicit dissociable patterns 
of temporal cortex activation, with speech movements activating traditional language 
processing areas in both hemispheres, including auditory cortex (Campbell et al., 2001; 
Calvert et al., 1997). In addition to activating pSTS, hand motion is associated with activity 
in inferior right pSTS and inferior parietal lobule (Thompson et al., 2007), extending into 
middle occipital and lingual gyri (Pelphrey et al., 2005), whereas eye movements are 
associated with activity in more superior and posterior portions of the right pSTS (Pelphrey 
et al., 2005) and elicit stronger responses in these pSTS regions for mutual than for averted 
gaze (Pelphrey et al., 2004). Other areas, including ventral premotor and intraparietal cortex, 
also show differential selectivity to the motion of different body parts, in a somatotopic 
manner (Wheaton et al., 2004; Buccino et al., 2001). 
Selectivity to whole-body movements relative to non-biological motion is evident as early as 
80-100ms post-stimulus onset over the left parieto-occipital region (Pavlova et al., 2006; 
Pavlova et al., 2004), regardless of whether the participant is attending to the stimuli 
(Pavlova et al., 2006). Subsequent selectivity for whole-body motion is evident at several 
different stages, each associated with different brain regions, including fusiform and 
superior temporal cortices, but typically only when the stimuli are attended (2006; Pavlova 
et al., 2004; 2007; Hirai et al., 2005; Jokisch et al., 2005; Hirai & Hiraki, 2006). 
The distribution of responses in STS and surrounding cortex to the motion of different body 
parts suggests a functional organization in which distinct but overlapping patches of cortex 
extract body-part specific representations of biological motion, with a posterior region of 
STS, especially in the right hemisphere, encoding a higher-level representation of biological 
motion that is not dependent on the particular body part generating that motion. Consistent 
with the first part of this hypothesis is the considerable evidence for an important role for 
areas of STS in the integration of motion and form information, especially that related to 
social perception (e.g., Beauchamp, 2005; Oram & Perrett, 1996; Puce et al., 2003; Vaina et al., 
2001). With respect to the second part of this hypothesis, there is some debate over whether 
pSTS analyzes local image motion and higher-level optic flow or some more global motion 
of the whole figure (Lange & Lappe, 2006; Giese & Poggio, 2003; Thompson et al., 2005; 
Beintema & Lappe, 2002). While this issue has yet to be fully resolved, recent evidence is 
building up in favour of the latter proposal. Two computational models of biological motion 
perception (Giese & Poggio, 2003; Lange & Lappe, 2006) propose that a ventral form 
pathway derives ‘snapshots’ that represent the various static postures comprising a 
movement sequence. Neuroimaging evidence indicates these snapshots are derived by the 
EBA and FBA (Peelen et al., 2006). In one model (Giese & Poggio, 2003), these snapshots are 
summated and temporally smoothed in ventral visual areas on the basis of local image 
motion information derived in separate areas, including pSTS. The other model (Lange & 
Lappe, 2006) proposes that more superior cortical areas, especially pSTS, temporally 
integrate sequences of intact body configurations, a suggestion also supported by 
neuroimaging evidence (Thompson et al., 2005; Peuskens et al., 2005). Nonetheless, it is 
possible that pSTS both analyzes local image motion, at an early stage, and, at later stage, 
the more global motion information related to changes in body and body part 
configurations over time, subsequent to the analysis of individual configurations of body 
form in the EBA and FBA and facial form in the face-selective areas of occipital and fusiform 
cortex and perhaps also STS. 
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2.3 Putting it all together: How we perceive and understand bodily actions 
We have been emphasizing the use of structural form and motion information in the 
perception and identification of bodies (as distinct from other visual objects), body postures 
and movements. The evidence reviewed above points to the following account. The human 
visual system contains mechanisms specialized for processing the form of the human body, 
with distinct mechanisms encoding the form of body parts and configural relations between 
those parts. The ability to recognize (at least non-emotional) body postures relies on 
configural cues towards the template end of a continuum that extends from part-based to 
holistic processing, specifically, on cues specifying the structural hierarchy of body parts. 
The human visual system also contains mechanisms specialized for processing the motion of 
human bodies and body parts, as distinct from other forms of motion. Some mechanisms 
encode local image motion and higher-level optic flow, and a full model of how these 
various routines and processes are integrated and work together is captured in the 
Interactive Encoding Model of e-motion perception (Dittrich, 1999). He argues that it seems 
unlikely that one or both types of these mechanisms will be found to be specific to the 
processing of biological motion. Other mechanisms, which have been suggested to be 
specific to biological motion (see reviews below), encode the translations of body form over 
time, integrating form information captured in snapshots of the moving body with the local 
motion and optic flow information. Again, Dittrich (1999) argues that neither of these 
general mechanisms (snapshot capturing or optic flow) seem specific to or even necessary 
for perceiving biological motion. Instead, as proposed in the Interactive Encoding Model, 
the processing of biological motion depends on a particular way of neuronal coding in the 
brain by motion integrators (instead of motion detectors) and three cognitive routines 
depending on the motion information available. The first routine is strictly associated with 
the analysis of the structural components of human motion to reconstruct 3D body-related 
emotion information out of the 2D motion trajectory. The second routine is part of the 
working memory system and allows the application of cognitive constraints relating to 
human emotions and their motion trajectories for the 3D reconstruction. The third routine 
relies on visual semantics related to emotion categories as stored in long-term memory. 
Our review here has been necessarily brief. For readers interested in finding out more about 
the intricacies of human body and biological motion perception, in addition to Dittrich’s 
(1999) Interactive Encoding model, we suggest the following reviews: de Gelder (2006), 
Giese and Poggio (2003), Puce and Perrett (2003), Blake and Shiffrar (2007), and Peelen and 
Downing (2007). 
Is such an image-processing account, or an extension of it, sufficient for explaining our 
ability to perceive and understand bodily actions? The majority of human postures and 
movements are not aimless but are directed towards some purpose or goal and thus reflect 
that person’s intentions and may also or instead reflect their emotional and other internal 
states. Moreover, humans are not passive observers but like the people whose postures and 
movements they are observing, have intentions and emotions and act in a purposive, goal-
directed manner. Research and theory over the past decade or so suggests that one (and 
perhaps the main or even the only) route to understanding others’ actions depends on the 
observer’s own action capabilities (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004; Gallese et al., 2004). One 
productive source of evidence for this view is the body of findings showing neural 
mechanisms with dual functions in action perception and action production. For example, 
so-called mirror neurons in the premotor cortex of monkeys were found to respond not only 
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when the monkey prepares to perform an action itself, but also when the monkey observes 
the same visually presented action performed by someone else (e.g., Rizzolatti et al., 1996). 
Various supportive findings suggesting the existence of a mirror neuron system, if not 
actual mirror neurons, have also been obtained in humans. Observing another’s actions 
results in desynchronization in motor cortex as measured with magnetoencephalography 
(Hari et al., 1998), and lowers the threshold for producing motor responses when 
transcranial magnetic stimulation is used to activate motor cortex (Strafella & Paus, 2000). 
Imitating another’s actions via observation activates premotor cortex in functional imaging 
studies (Iacoboni et al., 1999); moreover, such activation is somatotopic with respect to the 
body part that is observed to perform the action, even in the absence of any overt action on 
the part of the subject (Buccino et al., 2001). 
These and numerous other findings indicating the existence of a human mirror neuron 
system suggest a simulation account of action understanding, according to which observing 
another perform an action triggers in the observer an offline simulation of the viewed 
action. Work on motor control indicates ways in which such simulations may be 
computationally instantiated, in the form of forward models, inverse models, or both (Miall, 
2003; Grush, 2004; Wolpert et al., 2003). Forward models use copies of the motor commands 
to map the current sensory states and motor commands to the future sensory and motor 
states that will result once the current motor commands have been executed. Inverse models 
perform the opposite transformations, by mapping sensory representations associated with 
the intended action to the motor commands to execute the action. One suggestion, for 
example, is that proposed by Wolpert et al. (2003) and also comprehensively envisaged in 
the Interactive Encoding Model (Dittrich, 1999): When observing another’s action, the 
observer’s brain generates a set of motor commands that would be produced given the 
observed movements and the current state of the observed person. Rather than driving the 
observer’s own motor behaviour, these motor commands are used to predict the sensory 
and motor consequences of the observed action, which are then compared with the observed 
new state of the actor. 
3. Bodily form and motion cues in emotion perception 
There is compelling evidence that the kinematics of body and body-part movements are at 
least sufficient, and may often be important, in furnishing cues for the perception of 
emotional expressions. For example, using point-light knocking and drinking arm 
movements as stimuli, Pollick et al. (2001) found that judgements of anger and happiness 
were more likely when the movements were fast and jerky, and that judgements of sadness 
were more closely associated with slow and smooth movements. And Sawada et al. (2003) 
reported that arm movements made with the intention of expressing joy, sadness, or anger 
varied in their velocity, acceleration, and displacement, and that differences in these factors 
predicted the ability of observers to distinguish between the three types of emotional 
expression. Nonetheless, there is also evidence that form-related cues in moving bodies and 
faces, in addition to kinematics, contribute to emotion perception. Bassili (1978) reported 
greater emotion classification accuracy for full-light compared to point-light facial 
movements, except for happy expressions. Dittrich (1991) found equivalent emotion 
recognition performance for point-light face stimuli in which the dots demarcated key facial 
structures (e.g., eyes, mouth) and those in which the dots were positioned randomly on the 
face. This result contrasts with Hill et al.’s (2003) finding that sex judgements from facial 
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movements were more accurate with spatially normalized than pseudo-random dot 
placement, and thus highlights the relationship between form and motion information in 
specifying cues for emotion perception. In our own work, we have reported a reduction in 
emotion recognition performance with point-light (Dittrich et al., 1996) and patch-light 
(Atkinson et al., 2004) compared to full-light displays of body movements. 
Building on this earlier work, we have demonstrated robust effects of stimulus inversion 
and motion reversal on the classification of basic emotions from patch-light and full-light 
movie clips of bodily expressions (Atkinson et al., 2007). Inverting the 3-second long movies 
significantly impaired emotion recognition accuracy, but did so more in the patch-light than 
in the full-light displays, indicating that inversion disrupts the processing of form cues more 
than it does the processing of kinematic and dynamic cues. Playing the movies backwards 
also significantly impaired emotion recognition accuracy, but this effect was only marginally 
greater for the patch-light than for the full-light displays, providing qualified support for the 
importance of the sequencing of changes in form to judgements of emotions from body 
gestures. While we cannot be certain that our stimulus manipulations completely eliminated 
all cues other than kinematics, even when in combination, the substantial reduction in 
emotion classification performance, especially for the inverted, reversed patch-light 
displays, attests to the importance of form cues in emotion perception; conversely, the fact 
that emotion classification performance was still substantially above chance, even in the 
inverted, reversed patch-light displays, attests to the importance of kinematics in providing 
cues for emotion perception. While it is likely that inversion of biological motion disrupts 
the processing of dynamic cues related to movement within the earth’s gravitational field, if 
that were all that inversion impaired, then we should not have seen a greater effect of 
orientation for the patch-light compared to full-light stimuli. 
The results of this study provide partial support for Dittrich et al.’s (1996) modified version 
of Walk and Homan’s (1984) “alarm hypothesis”, insofar as the identification of fearful and 
disgusted body movements was disproportionately impaired by inversion, suggesting a 
more important role for static form cues in the recognition of these emotions compared to 
the other emotions. On this reasoning, however, one would also expect a similar effect for 
anger, the identification of which was not disproportionately impaired by inversion. 
Consistent with the idea that an important diagnostic feature of fearful body movements is 
that they often involve cowering or retreating, which when reversed would appear as 
advancements, fear recognition was also disproportionately impaired by motion reversal. 
What specific form-related cues are utilized in emotion perception from body expressions? 
One suggestion is that the overall shape of particular body postures, such as their angularity 
or roundedness, informs emotion judgements (Aronoff et al., 1992). The inversion effects 
that we found (Atkinson et al., 2007) highlight the importance of relational or configural 
cues, adding weight to previous claims that configural information plays an important role 
in subserving emotion perception from body expressions (Dittrich et al., 1996; Stekelenburg 
& de Gelder, 2004). In contrast, the effects of motion reversal tentatively suggest a possible 
role for spatiotemporal cues (changes in form over time) in emotion recognition. Given the 
conventional and sometimes symbolic (Buck, 1984) nature of our actors’ movements (see 
Atkinson et al., 2004 for details), we speculate that configurations of static form and their 
changes over time are more closely associated with representations of what people do with 
their bodies than with how they move them, the latter being specified mostly by kinematics 
(see also Giese & Poggio, 2003). 
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In emphasizing the roles of configural form cues and kinematics in the recognition of 
emotions from body movements, we do not wish to deny the possible importance of 
simulation accounts of emotion recognition. As with action understanding in general 
(discussed in Section 2.3), purely image-processing accounts may not be sufficient for 
emotional expression understanding, or at any rate may not detail the only means by which 
we can understand others’ emotional expressions. One way in which we might be able to 
recognize the emotional state of another is via our perception of an emotional response 
within ourselves (Adolphs, 2002; Atkinson & Adolphs, 2005; Gallese et al., 2004; Atkinson, 
2007; Heberlein & Adolphs, 2007; Goldman & Sripada, 2005). One version of this idea is that 
a visual representation of another’s expression leads us to experience what that person is 
feeling (i.e., emotional contagion), which allows us then to infer that person’s emotional 
state. That is, the grounds for inferring the viewed person’s emotional state is knowledge 
from the ‘inside’; experiencing the emotion for oneself (even in an attenuated or 
unconscious form) is an important, perhaps necessary, step to accurate judgements about 
the other’s emotion. A different but conceivably compatible idea is that coming to know 
what another is feeling involves simulating the viewed emotional state via the generation of 
a somatosensory image of the associated body state (Adolphs, 2002), or simulating the 
motor programs for producing the viewed expression (Carr et al., 2003; Gallese et al., 2004; 
Leslie et al., 2004). 
4. Implications for computer vision and AI 
The implementation of an emotion model into computer vision and AI has widespread 
consequences for future technologies and research approaches. For example, virtual reality 
scenarios recently have tried to include emotions in various ways. We will briefly mention 
the implications of the psychology of emotion expression and recognition for affective 
computing in such fields as AI, HCI, robotics and telecommunications. The use of emotions 
for future technologies will be discussed and some strengths and weaknesses of the 
application of emotional behaviours will be addressed. 
In the previous sections we reviewed evidence for and argued that the ability to identify 
bodily expressions of emotion relies on specific types of both visual form and motion cues, 
and that the relative reliance on these different types of cue can vary across emotions. 
Several suggestions for affective computing can be drawn from this work, especially when 
viewed in the light of the Interactive Encoding Model proposed by Dittrich (1999). He 
argues for the integration of low-level processing of structural motion routines with more 
conceptually-driven semantic processing. These integrative processes are strictly resource-
dependent but amenable to learning through continuous updating in working memory (see 
Figure 1). 
A prediction of the Interactive Encoding model is that there is a strategic transition from 
input-driven to conceptually-driven processing as the performer develops more elaborate 
cognitive processes. The level of stimulus encoding therefore seems to be variable, 
depending on the amount and type of information available to the observer. Such an 
information flow characterized by multiple interactions and continuous updating is linked 
together through what are termed ‘motion integrators’. The idea is that ‘motion integrators’ 
operating at a perceptual and cognitive level of visual processing and requiring attention are 
integral to skilled pattern recognition in a domain such as emotion recognition and can be 
directly translated to affective computing (see Dittrich, 1999). This model is, on the one 
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hand, brain-inspired, as recent models of artificial computing are, but on the other hand, 
guided by the functional process model of emotion processing. Emotions are seen as 
grounded in the overall interactive nature of input-output characteristics of the artificial 
device (where between input and output one has to infer some intervening variables, such 
as homeostatic variables of the system state, or emotional variables), and as playing a 
regulatory role, both internally and externally. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Sketch of the Interactive Encoding Model for E-Motion Perception. (Note: ‘Dynamic 
emotions’ include body as well as facial expressions, and are usually dynamic events.) 
In this sense, a developmental or ethological approach to implementing emotions in artifacts 
(“understanding by building”), favoured by many robot designers at present (e.g., Breazeal, 
2002; Pfeifer, 2002; Brooks & Stein, 1994), might, however, not necessarily be regarded as the 
only or most efficient way to equip artifacts with emotional capabilities. As Brooks (1991; 
2002) quite rightly pointed out, the notion of embodiment seems one possible avenue of 
how to achieve the necessary grounding of emotions. However, for implementing and 
linking biological input–output characteristics, several avenues and theoretical models from 
the behavioural and brains sciences become available. For example, we argue that the role of 
emotions is not restricted to expressive display characteristics; rather, emotions have a much 
wider impact on behavioural regulation in multi-layered and multi-agent artifacts. They 
form part of more general structures or are instrumental for a wide range of adaptive 
functions in an organism (Schneider & Dittrich, 1989). Analogously, the roles of emotions in 
artifacts may reach from a simple indication of its state (e.g., energy needs, spatial 
arrangements) to the highest levels of mental regulation (e.g., consciousness, imagination or 
turn-taking, and intentionality). Following this line of argument, we consider the role of 
emotions as ideally suited to fit perfectly Brooks’s (1991) demand for structures that form 
part of the control systems in a way that fits exactly into existing structures, and are both 
totally distributed and also local in their operations. In this sense, we argue that the role of 
emotions and emotion recognition is not only crucial but the key for any artificial device or 
robot to pass the ‘Total Turing Test’ as specified by Harnad (2000). Therefore, an Emotional 
Turing Test has to form part of any Total Turing Test. The Emotional Turing Test will satisfy 
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Harnad’s (2000) useful criterion of some kind of embodiment for a Turing test in which 
there is no screen between the candidate and the interrogator. Why and how could it be? 
In a useful overview article “Multiagent systems: milestones and new horizons”, which 
summarizes the immense progress made by a second generation of multiagent architectures, 
Sen (1997) quite rightly sees the field at a critical juncture. Nevertheless, it is revealing that 
in the whole article the term ‘emotion’ is not mentioned once. Similarly, when Schaal (1999) 
asked the question “Is imitation learning the route to humanoid robots?” not once is 
emotion addressed. This situation has dramatically changed over the last 10 years, not the 
least through Picard’s (1997) influential book “Affective Computing”. One of the early 
researchers to implement social features and emotional signals in robots is Cynthia Breazeal 
(for overviews, see Breazeal, 2002; 2003) with KISMET. But see also the pioneering work of 
Takeuchi and Nagao (1992), who developed a computer interface with synthetic facial 
displays. In these approaches the importance of emotional displays is strongly recognized 
and seen as crucial for the successful development of robots. For example, KISMET’s skills 
include the ability to direct the robot’s focus to establish shared reference (‘joint viewing’), 
the ability to display readable expressions to the human, the ability to recognize expressive 
movements such as praise and rejection, the ability to take turns during social learning and 
the ability to regulate interaction to provide sensible learning situations (‘emotion-driven 
learning’). Often, as in the case of KISMET, the implementation of expressive movements 
and emotion recognition is based on (a) facial expressions, (b) gestures or body movement 
in the visual modality, and (c) affective speech or affective sound variations in the auditory 
modality. 
Generally, in affective computing, emotions can mirror the two regulatory roles emotions 
have, namely intra-individual and inter-individual. Emotions can be used, on the one hand, 
in the form of emotional visual expressions for social interactions and communication and, 
on the other hand, in order to organise and prioritise behaviours. The first aspect is more 
concerned with the relationship between people whereas the second aspect refers to the 
internal regulation of behaviours through selection, coordination or shifting of output 
priorities. The latter roles seem closely linked to some of the most evolved mental activities 
in humans such as consciousness or intentionality and would constitute the core of any 
“autonomous agent” (e.g., Dean, 1998; Kozma & Fukuda, 2006). Nevertheless, one needs to 
acknowledge that sometimes emotions are of no direct use, as Arbib (2005) quite rightly 
pointed out. Queuing for the bus seems a useful activity but showing anger about the length 
of the queue might be of no use when it is the last bus to make the journey into town. In 
other words, to display emotions or not seems closely linked to the debate on “autonomous 
agents”.  
Occasionally, in addition to changes in the form of the body and in its movements, changes 
in body colour are associated with emotional responses in humans; for example, a 
reddening of the face in anger or increased pallor in fear (Drummond & Quah, 2001; 
Drummond, 1997). Similarly, colours could be used to generate some kind of emotional 
display in virtual reality scenarios and computing. However, as the association between 
colours and emotional interpretations is quite vague and often subjective, if not spurious, 
such attempts seem less fruitful in the long run. Colours might be used as a common frame 
of reference as with traffic lights, but emotional significance should not be assumed as self-
evident; rather, it needs to be defined for each instance as, for example, a red light should be 
taken unambiguously as a stop signal. It does not seem fruitful to rely on peoples’ feelings 
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or interpretations of colour as emotional signals. Various attempts to use colour as 
emotional signals in sports environments testify to the difficulties of relying on emotional 
colour information. A controversial study by Frank and Gilovich (1988), for example, 
reported that the wearing of black uniforms in professional sports leads to increased 
aggression and more penalties. Movement from a non-black to a black uniform team results 
in an increase in penalties. When watching sport events on a colour monitor where teams 
wear black and non-black uniforms, increases in perceived rule violations for the referees 
and the actions of the players themselves are reported by observers. A more recent study by 
Hill and Barton (2005), which seems not to be as methodologically problematic as the one by 
Frank and Gilovich (1988), found, across a range of competitive sports, a tendency for 
individuals or teams who wore red to have a higher probability of winning. While the 
underlying principles for such an advantage remain unclear, their uncovering will have the 
potential for greatly stimulating affective computing as well as psychology. Yet, whereas 
colour is without doubt a very strong stimulus, its significance for emotion processing is not 
as clear-cut as necessary to suggest in a straightforward way its use in affective computing. 
One implication from findings on how we perceive visual facial expressions can be seen in 
the development of automatic systems to detect and categorize facial expressions. In order 
to do this the coding of facial behaviours has to be automated. A prime candidate for such 
attempts, Ekman and Friesen’s (1978) Facial Action Coding System (FACS), has been used 
because of the precise description of facial movements and the standardized catalogue of 
corresponding emotion labels. The development of such automated systems is not without 
its difficulties, however, primarily because of the wide range of physiognomic differences 
between individuals, which affects the variability of visual display characteristics such as 
eyebrow or mouth movements. Kaiser and Wehrle (1992) tried to solve such problems by 
adopting a combined approach using FACS as an expert system teaching a connectionist 
network fuzzy rules to measure facial movements automatically. The combination of fuzzy 
rules together with an artificial neural network has proven more successful in overcoming 
the variability problem than traditional methods such as expert systems or connectionist 
systems on their own. 
The use of visual signals as emotional indicators is particularly relevant for 
telecommunications, and highlights two opposing principles. On the one side, despite the 
ever-increasing storage capacities of computer chips one tenet in telecommunication is 
nevertheless the reduction of the information flow between sender and receiver to save 
processing costs and minimise errors. On the other side, emotional signals are more often 
than not characterized by subtle changes in form or motion. Now the dilemma for the 
telecommunication architect seems obvious. First, there is the question of how much 
information is necessary to portray the emotional state in addition to the identity. Second, 
there is the question of how to build a system that is able to pick up reciprocal behaviour. 
Such new systems would have to go far beyond the FACS model or the concept of a small 
set of basic emotions (see Ortony & Turner, 1990). But which psychological emotion theory 
should be embraced instead?  
One option is the appraisal model of emotions. Quite interestingly, the majority of the 
computer models of emotions, if they refer expressly to psychological theories, are based on 
the so-called appraisal theories. The fascination with these theories most likely stems from 
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the fact that they can be converted into programme code in a more or less direct way. 
Consider, for example, Ortony, Clore and Collins’s view (1988), which assumes that 
emotions develop as a consequence of certain cognitions and interpretations. This view 
concentrates exclusively on the cognitive elicitors of emotions: events, agents and objects. 
Their central assumption is that emotions represent value-based reactions to our perceptions 
of the world. One can be pleased about the consequences of an event or not; one can endorse 
or reject the actions of an agent or one can like or not like aspects of an object. Furthermore, 
events can have consequences for others or for oneself, and an acting agent can be another 
or oneself. The consequences of an event for another can be desirable or undesirable; the 
consequences for oneself can lead to relevant or irrelevant expectations. Relevant 
expectations for oneself finally can be differentiated again according to whether they 
actually occur or not. The authors further define a set of global and local intensity variables, 
which operate over all three emotion categories. Although no formalization of their model is 
explicitly provided, every emotion can be described using a formal notation, which makes 
their model so attractive to the computing community. A problem with the model is that not 
all stimuli can be directly evaluated because, quite often, there are strong pre-wired 
stimulus-response relationships for which explicit appraisal procedures would not apply or 
stimuli that are processed subliminally in emotion processing without further appraisal. 
Thus whereas the phenomenon of implicit emotion processing is common in humans, it 
seems a major unsolved challenge for full implementation in affective computing. 
Another elaborate appraisal model has been suggested by Scherer (1984; Ellsworth & 
Scherer, 2003), in which five functionally defined subsystems at various levels of 
consciousness are involved with emotional processes. An information-processing subsystem 
evaluates the stimulus through perception, memory, forecast and evaluation of available 
information. A supporting subsystem adjusts the internal condition through control of 
neuroendocrine, somatic and autonomous states. A leading subsystem plans, prepares 
actions and selects between competitive motives. An acting subsystem controls motor 
expression and visible behaviour. Finally, a monitor subsystem controls the attention that is 
assigned to the present states and passes the resulting feedback on to the other subsystems. 
Emotion-related appraisals are implemented by the information-processing subsystem, 
which in Scherer’s model are called stimulus evaluation checks, and which lead to changes 
in the other subsystems. Each emotion can be clearly characterized by a mix of the stimulus 
evaluation checks and subchecks. 
A very interesting appraisal model has been suggested in the form of the “communicative 
theory of emotions” (Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1996). This model proposes a hierarchy of 
simultaneously operative processing modules, which work asynchronously on different 
tasks. These instances are coordinated by a central control or operating system.  This control 
system contains a model of the entire system. The functioning of the whole system depends 
on communication between modules. According to Oatley and Johnson-Laird (1996) there 
are two kinds of communication between modules: propositional or symbolic, through 
which actual information about the environment is conveyed, and non-propositional, whose 
primary role is related to the emotions. The task of the non-propositional form of 
communication is less to convey information and more to shift the entire system of modules 
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into a state of increased attention, the so-called emotion mode. This function seems not 
unlike the global interrupt programs on computers. 
The appraisal models of emotion outlined above are just three of the most prominent of a 
wide range of cognitive approaches (see also e.g., Frijda, 1986, 1993; Roseman et al., 1996; 
Lerner & Keltner, 2000; Levine et al., 2001). This variety of models, all linked to one or 
another kind of appraisal process, clearly demonstrates a dilemma for the computing 
community. Which of the many models should be adopted as the most promising in 
affective computing? Again, it seems as if the hope for general answers to such a question is 
futile. Instead, computer scientists concentrate more on the criteria of applicability for their 
solutions. In this sense, questions of implementation and availability of programming tools 
have had priority in the past. In the future, there are challenges ahead to look beyond 
valence models of emotion in psychology and equip artifacts with a range of different 
emotional processes that work together in the end. To highlight the challenges ahead and 
hint at possible solutions for the most complicated area of emotional processing linked to 
consciousness and intentionality, we focus on a concrete example below. 
At the other end of the spectrum when considering the regulatory contributions of 
emotional features in multi-agent systems, the concepts of meaning and intentionality have 
to be taken more seriously (see Dittrich, 1999). It is argued that progress is made only if 
designers move away from the gestalt or beyond a valence view when combining multi-
feature input characteristics and fully embrace a more holistic view based on the overall 
input-output and intervening variable states, including emotional states. For a holistic 
design approach the question of emotional regulation between multiple agents and, finally, 
intentionality seems of utmost importance. However, implementing intentional features in 
artifacts is one of the greatest challenges affective computing faces, as it requires the 
combination of emotional and cognitive states. Intentionality seems to have two aspects to 
it, namely target-directed and goal-directed. Both functions fall together sometimes, for 
example, when a pack of wolves target and hunt a sheep herd to catch a prey. Such a rather 
narrative scenario has been simplified, simulated and studied by Dittrich and Lea (1994), in 
order to investigate directly the perception of intentional motion. A visual display was 
developed in which multiple objects moved randomly except one (see Figure 2). This one 
object always moved towards one of the other randomly moving objects. This is typical for 
predator/prey scenarios. Three separate factors were identified, all of which contributed to 
the perception of intentional motion in an object by an observer: (1) the object moved in a 
direct fashion; (2) the object moved faster than other objects; and (3) the goal towards which 
the object was moving was visible. The fact that identification of intentional motion 
depended on three separate factors suggests that the perception of intentionality is a rather 
complex concept depending on the integration of different dynamic features of multiple 
objects. Therefore, one of the challenges for the architecture of artificial devices is how such 
‘motion integrators’ can be designed in multi-layered systems. The successful 
implementation of such e-motion features in artifacts would not only be seen as a major step 
in realizing the tenets of embodiment but as central to understand the workings of the 
animal and human brains at a psychological level. The notion of intelligence would be 
demystified in a major way. Only then would interaction with robots be able to constitute 
significant relationships in people’s lives. Real-life scenarios could be entered into or re-
enacted and virtual reality become a reality in life. 
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Fig. 2. The wolf-sheep scenario: The thin lines denote the movement trace of random 
moving objects. The thick line is the movement trace of the objects imbued with intention 
(for more detailed explanation, see text). 
5. Conclusion 
We suggest two recommendations for affective computing. First, affective computing 
researchers should heed the findings of psychology and neuroscience. We grant that 
machines that recognize emotional expressions or that behave emotionally need not achieve 
these feats in exactly the way humans and their brains do. Nonetheless, a better 
understanding of human perception and human emotions can aid affective computing by 
narrowing down the search space of possible solutions and by providing a rich set of clues 
for alternative solutions within that space. We have tried to give a flavour of how emotion 
perception, as well as emotions more generally, are implemented in humans. In summary: 
Emotions have roles in both communication and behavioural organization. The 
communication of emotions is multimodal. With respect to the perception of bodily 
expressed emotions, humans rely on a mixture of visual form and motion cues, particularly 
configural form and motion as well as kinematic cues. The relative reliance on these 
different types of cue can vary across emotions. Evidence reviewed here suggests the 
functional architecture of human emotion perception is both modular and interactive. In 
particular, visual emotion perception involves, inter alia, subsystems specialized for 
processing the form and motion of others’ bodies, and other, modality-general subsystems 
that evaluate and signal the value of stimuli and events to the observer’s own welfare and 
interests. At least in some cases, these latter processes subsequently modulate the activity of 
the visual mechanisms. Evidence also suggests that existence of other subsystems that 
simulate observed expressions or actions and/or that simulate the changes in internal body 
state associated with the viewed expression or action. Attempts to emulate human emotion 
recognition in machines will require detailed knowledge not only of how all these different 
subsystems operate but also of how they interact, so it is heartening to note that this is now 
a focus of research in cognitive neuroscience. With respect to the role of emotions in 
behavioural organization, research on human emotions indicates the importance of basic 
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level regulatory functions as well as high-order mental activities related to consciousness 
and intentionality, which also in turn influence perception and communication. 
Our second recommendation is that, on the basis of the findings from psychology and 
neuroscience, affective computing researchers might want to give serious consideration to 
the question of whether giving a machine the capacity to experience emotions might be one 
way in which it could achieve reliable and efficient emotion recognition. Indeed, it might 
also or instead be beneficial to consider the flipside of this question, that is, whether 
installing an ability to recognize emotions in others might be an important or even necessary 
step in building a machine that experiences genuine emotions. 
Affective computing could be a powerful tool to produce a new generation of artificial 
devices. However, we suggest that a new approach to affective computing based on the 
above recommendations may support the design of emotional agents as well as the 
implementation of emotional reactions into different types of machinery. It is possible that 
the features of human emotions that we have outlined above are not directly applicable to 
AI or computer science models of emotions. Even so, we suggest that the role of emotions in 
regulating the internal functioning and external behaviour of multi-layered and multi-agent 
systems needs to form the core of affective computing attempts to simulate the overall 
distribution and at the same time local display of emotional characteristics. 
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